Assumption of Risk—Basis for Denial of Recovery? by anon,
Washington Law Review 
Volume 41 
Number 3 The Common Market—A Symposium; 
Annual Survey of Washington Law 
6-1-1966 
Assumption of Risk—Basis for Denial of Recovery? 
anon 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
 Part of the Torts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
anon, Annual Survey of Washington Law, Assumption of Risk—Basis for Denial of Recovery?, 41 Wash. L. 
Rev. 585 (1966). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol41/iss3/24 
This Annual Survey of Washington Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals 
at UW Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of 
UW Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
SURVEY OF VASHINGTON LAW
with the tenet that "the essence of a 'transfer' [for purposes of taxa-
tion] is the passage of control over the economic benefits of property
rather than any technical changes in its title."9 The result is further
supported by the fact that the incorporators were the shareholders of
the corporation, a fact indicative of control remaining static.
Recitation of nominal consideration in quitclaim deeds is desirable
as a factor in insuring irrevocability."0 To hold that such recitation is
sufficient to assess a second tax would be to ignore the fact that nothing
given by the trustees had been bargained for. As the distribution in
Deer Park was in satisfaction of the pre-existing rights of the share-
holders, so the transfer in the principal case was in satisfaction of the
pre-existing right of the transferee corporation. In neither case was
there the bargained-for consideration required by the statute.
Since transfers of real property can be accomplished without even
nominal consideration, to regard the payment of such consideration as
sufficient for purposes of the excise tax would accomplish nothing
beyond creating a trap for the unwary. Plaintiffs, for example, could
have avoided the possibility of their transaction falling within the pro-
visions of the transfer tax statute by originally taking the property in
fee, and making a gift of it to the corporation" after acquisition of a
few shares of corporate stock. Clearly, the court was correct in its
refusal to foster the development of a situation in which the question
of imposition of a tax would depend upon the form of the transfer,
without regard to its substance.
ASSUMPTION OF RISK-BASIS FOR DENIAL OF
RECOVERY?
A recent decision of the Washington Supreme Court casts consider-
able doubt on the exact status of the defense of assumption of risk, and
illustrates a serious problem concerning the judicial process in Wash-
ington. The action was brought against a school district for injuries
Sanford's Estate v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39, 43 (1939) (dictum).
" A conveyance is not a contract, although it results from an agreement, and
consideration is not necessary in a deed unless it operates under the Statute of Uses.
Most conveyances, however, recite at least nominal consideration in order to rebut
the reservation of an equitable estate in favor of the grantor and to furnish support
for the conveyance as a bargain and sale. Such acknowledgement is conclusive upon
the parties for the purpose of supporting the conveyance. See generally TIFFANY,
REAL PROrERTY 680 & nn. 59, 61-64 (new abr. ed. 1940), and cases cited therein.
" WASH. REv. CODE § 28.45.010 (1963) provides that the term "sale" "shall not
include a transfer by gift, devise, or inheritance...."
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received by a spectator at a high school football game. The school
district supervised the game, no admission was charged, and the
plaintiff, as a relative of one of the football players, was encouraged
to attend. The plaintiff, who had previously seen only one football
game, was standing about one foot from the side lines when a player
was knocked out of bounds and into her, permanently injuring her.
The superior court concluded that defendant school district was not
negligent, that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent, and that the
plaintiff had voluntarily assumed the risk of being injured by standing
in close proximity to the side lines. On appeal, the Washington Su-
preme Court affirmed. Held: Assumption of risk is one valid ground
for denying a "social invitee" recovery for personal injuries. Perry v.
Seattle School District, 66 Wash. Dec. 2d 786, 405 P.2d 589 (1965).
Historically, assumption of risk emerged, or at least received its
greatest development, from the common-law action of a servant against
his master.1 For many years, Washington recognized assumption of
risk as a defense2 in master-_servant relationships.3 The Washington
Supreme Court, however, later overruled those previous decisions and
abolished the doctrine as a defense in master-servant cases.4 Subse-
quently, the court stated that it had abolished the doctrine in a rela-
tionship other than master-servant,' and noted with approval decisions
from other jurisdictions that treat assumption of risk not as a separate
defense, but rather as included within the general concept of contribu-
tory negiligence.6
The court in the principal case did not refer to these recent Wash-
ington decisions concerning assumption of ri~k. The court in the prin-
1 PROSSER, TORTS 450 n.3 (3d ed. 1964) citing Priestly v. Fowler, 3 Mees. & W. 1.,
150 Eng. Rep. 1030 (1837).2Except as otherwise indicated, "defense" is used in this note in a broad sense
of denial of relief, including both "no legal cause," which is an affirmative defense
with the burden of pleading and proof on the defendant, and "no duty," which
is a negation of part of the plaintiff's prima facie case.3 See, e.g., Focht v. Johnson, 51 Wn. 2d 47, 315 P.2d 633 (1957). See also Walsh
v. West Coast Coal Mines, 31 Wn. 2d 396, 197 P.2d 233 (1948).
' Miller v. St. Regis Paper Co., 60 Wn. 2d 484, 374 P.2d 675 (1962); Siragusa
v. Swedish Hosp., 60 Wn. 2d 310, 373 P2d 767 (1962), 38 WASH. L. REv. 349 (1963).
For a good historical analysis of assumption of risk in master-servant cases, see
Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co., 318 U.S. 54 (1943) (including Justice
Frankfurter's concurring opinion).
'Feigenbaum v. Brink, 66 Wash. Dec. 2d 117, 121, 401 P.2d 642, 645 (1965),
citing Engen v. Arnold, 61 Wn. 2d 641, 379 P.2d 990 (1963) (business invitee).
'Feigenbaum v. Brink, 66 Wash. Dec. 2d 117, 121, 401 P.2d 642, 645 (1965),
citing: Ford Motor Co. v. Arguello, 382 P.2d 886 (Wyo. 1963); McGrath v.
American Cyanamid Co., 41 N.J. 272, 196 A.2d 238 (1963); Rocky Mountain
Trucking Co. v. Taylor, 79 Wyo. 461, 335 P.2d 448 (1959); Howe v. Gambuzza,
15 N.J. Super. 368, 83 A.2d 466 (1951); White v. Ellison Realty Corp. 5 N.J.
228, 74 A.2d 401 (1950) ; Porter v. Cornett, 306 Ky. 25, 206 S.W.2d 83 (1947).
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cipal case stated that, ordinarily, the defense of assumption of risk
serves no useful function, since it introduces nothing that is not fully
covered either by the idea of an absence of duty on the part of the
defendant, or by the concept of contributory negligence of the plain-
tiff. This statement would seem to be consistent with the statements
in the recent cases that appear to abolish the doctrine. However, the
court in the principal case reasoned that assumption of risk does focus
attention upon the voluntary acceptance of a known risk, which is not
always involved in the other ideas. The court cited with approval
decisions from another jurisdiction which denied recovery because of
assumption of risk by the plaintiff," and, in its holding, the court con-
cluded that a finding of plaintiff's assumption of risk would have been
decisive.
Because of the conclusion reached by the court in the principal case,
the status of the defense of assumption of risk is very unsettled.
Definitive statements can be made only in master-servant cases. It
does seem quite clear that assumption of risk as a defense has been
abolished in cases in which the servant was injured by the master's
negligence. In other relationships, however, the court has not ade-
quately defined the applicability of assumption of risk as a defense.
The Washington court has stated that assumption of risk is the cor-
rect terminology only in employment cases, and that the proper doc-
trine in other cases is volenti non fit injuria.10 This approach has been
criticized as a "distinction without a difference," and termed a minority
position." Moreover, it appears that the Washington court is moving
away from this distinction, as the terminology used in both the prin-
" Accord, PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 1, at 451-52.
'Modec v. City of Eveleth, 224 Minn. 556, 29 N.W2d 453 (1947); Brisson
v. Minneapolis Baseball & Athletic Ass'n, 185 Minn. 507,240 N.W. 903 (1932).
Siragusa v. Swedish Hosp., 60 Wn. 2d 310, 319, 373 P.2d 767, 773 (1962):
The time has now come, therefore, to state unqualifiedly that an employer has a
duty to his employees to exercise reasonable care to furnish them with a
reasonably safe place to work. We now hold that if an employer negligently
fails in this duty, he may not assert, as a defense to an action based upon such
a breach of duty, that the injured employee is barred from recovery merely
because he was aware or should have known of the dangerous condition negli-
gently created or maintained. However, if the employee's voluntary exposure
to the risk is unreasonable under the circumstances, he will be barred from
recovery because of his contributory negligence. Knowledge and appreciation
of the risk of injury, on the part of the employee, are properly important
factors which should be given weight in the determination of the issues of
whether the employer is negligent in maintaining the dangerous condition
and whether the employee is contributorily negligent in exposing himself to it.
"See, e.g., 'Walsh v. West Coast Mines, 31 Wn. 2d 396, 408, 197 P2d 233, 239
(1948).
' PRossR, op. cit. supra note 1, at 450; See also R. Keeton, Assumption of
Risk in Products Liability Cases, 22 LA. L. Rxv. 122, n.1 (1961).
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cipal case and Feigenbaum v. Brink2 was assumption of risk rather
than volenti non fit injuria. Since the Washington court seems to have
abandoned the distinction, discussion in this note will be in terms of
assumption of risk.
In landlord-tenant relationships, use of assumption of risk may have
been abolished. Four members of the court' 3 in Feigenbaum reasoned
that it should be abolished, citing Siragusa v. Swedish Hospital4 and
Engen v. Arnold.'5 However, the concurring opinion in Feigenbaum,
although agreeing with the result, disagreed with abolishing assump-
tion of risk. Consequently, the decision in Feigenbaum probably must
be limited to its facts.' 6
In "invitee" cases, the use of assumption of risk is extremely con-
fused. The court in Feigenbaum stated that the defense of assumption
of risk had been abolished in an "invitee" case, citing Engen v. Arnold.
The court in Engen did state that the instruction to the jury on as-
sumption of risk should be redrafted in consonance with the holding
in Siragusa. However, it appears from both the reported decision and
the briefs that abolition of the defense of assumption of risk was not
in issue in Engen.Y7 Engen was "a business invitee" case, and con-
sequently, it may be distinguishable from the "social invitee" facts of
the principal case. The court in the principal case, however, did not
even mention Engen. It is quite probable that the failure to discuss
' 66 Wash. Dec. 2d 117, 401 P.2d 642 (1965).
'Judges Ott, Donworth, Hamilton and Hardyn B. Soule (pro tern.).
60 Wn. 2d 310, 373 P.2d 767 (1962).
"61 Wn. 2d 641, 379 P.2d 990 (1963).
" Judge Hill wrote the concurring opinion. Not only was there not a majority
favoring abolition (four-one-four split), but, in addition, Judge Hardyn B. Soule,
who was sitting pro tern, was one of the four members advocating abolition.
Judge Soule was sitting in his capacity pursuant to the legislative policy declara-
tion in WASH. REV. CODE § 2.04.240 (1965):
Whenever necessary for the prompt and orderly administration of justice... a
majority of the supreme court may appoint any regularly elected and qualified
judge of the superior court or any retired judge of a court of record in this state
to serve as judge pro tempore of the supreme court
This procedure undoubtedly assists the court in handling its tremendous workload,
and there is little criticism of this procedure when the court is sitting in depart-
ments. When sitting en banc, however, the drawbacks in using the pro tern system
may well outweigh any benefit.
One of the principal advantages of stare decisis is that it lends predictability to
the law. By their very nature, appellate cases are close questions, and grave doubt
is raised as to the precedential value of decisions rendered by a divided court
containing a pro tern judge. Feigenbaum serves as an illustration of this problem.
Had the vote been five to four in favor of abolition of assumption of risk, with the
pro tern judge voting for abolition, the rule of law could be quickly and unpredictably
changed with a change in the pro tern judge. If a case is sufficiently important to be
heard en banc, it should be heard by all nine regular judges.
I Brief for Appellant, p. 22; Brief for Appellee, p. 26, Engen v. Arnold, 61 Wn. 2d
641, 379 P.2d 990 (1963).
[VOL. 41:517
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Engen was due to oversight rather than to a reasoned policy decision.
Nevertheless, the principal case is the more recent statement, and the
court gives complete support to the use of assumption of risk as a
defense.ls
The court should decide on a definite approach to assumption of
risk, and should consistently apply the approach adopted. What the
proper approach should be has been a subject of considerable contro-
versy among commentators. There has been a strong movement among
certain legal scholars to abolish the defense in all cases other than
express agreements to assume.'9 The basic argument is that assump-
tion of risk serves no function that is not included in the concepts of
lack of duty or contributory negligence. Certainly not all writers in
the field are in agreement; some feel assumption of risk has merit as
an independent defense, which must be preserved. °
A suggested approach would be to recognize assumption of risk as
an affirmative defense, with the burden of pleading and proof on the
defendant, in cases in which the plaintiff actually agreed to assume the
risk. Agreement cases would include both express and implied-in-fact
agreements. 21 In non-agreement situations, analysis would be in terms
of absence of duty or contributory negligence, rather than assumption
of risk. This is basically the approach taken by the New Jersey Su-
preme Court,22 and, in terms of theoretical soundness and practical
applicability, it is perhaps the best. The New Jersey court, attempting
to avoid confusion, presents the trier of fact with only two issues, neg-
ligence and contributory negligence .2  The important point is not
so much what approach is taken, but that some definite approach be
taken.
" Judge Hunter concurred in part and dissented in part, and Judge Hale dissented,
joined by Judge Hamilton and Chief Justice Rosellini. However, neither of these
opinions expressed disapproval of the doctrine of assumption of risk.
"See FLEmING, TORTS 249-58 (2d ed. 1961); 2 HAtmPE & JAMEs, TORTS 1162-92(1956); Bohlen, Voluntary Assumption of Risk, 20 HAnv. L. REv. 14 (1906); James,
Assumption of Risk, 61 YALE L.J. 141 (1952) ; Mansfield, Informed Choice in the
Law of Torts, 22 LA. L. REv. 17 (1961) ; Payne, Assumption of Risk and Negligence,
35 CA. BAR REv. 350 (1957) ; Rice, The Automobile Guest and the Rationale of
Assumption of Risk, 27 MiNN. L. REv. 33 (1943); Wade, The Place of Assumption
of Risk in the Law of Negligence, 22 LA. L. REv. 5 (1961).
See PROSSEa, op. cit. supra note 1, at 453-56; R. Keeton, supra note 11.
It has been suggested that it would be difficult to instruct a jury on implied-
in-fact agreements of assumption of risk. Juries have been instructed, however, as
to implied-in-fact contracts, and the situations seem sufficiently analogous that it
should be workable to give instructions on implied-in-fact agreements. See generally
P. Keeton, Assumption of Risk and the Landowner, 22 LA. L. REv. 108, 112-18 (1961).
McGrath v. American Cyanamid Co. 41 N.J. 272, 196 A.2d 238 (1963) ; Meistrich
v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 155 A.2d 90 (1959).
' Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., supra note 22, at 96.
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The inconsistency in the Washington assumption of risk cases serves
to illustrate a serious problem in the judicial process. The language
and analysis used by the court in the principal case is contradictory
tQ that used in Feigenbaum, yet the cases were decided only five
months apart. 4 Possibly the court was dissatisfied with the expres-
sions in Feigenbaum that seemed to abolish the defense of assumption
of risk. However, if this was the court's reasoning in the principal
case, the court should have discussed and overruled or limited Feigen-
baum. It appears that the failure to discuss the earlier cases was due
to oversight rather than choice. Feigenbaum was not discussed in
either appellate brief. This raises a question of the proper role of the
judiciary: should the court sit solely as an arbitrator in an adversary
proceeding, or should the court conduct an independent investigation
into the state of the law? Certainly, the parties are in no position to
complain if the court does no more than read what is cited in the briefs.
Society, however, demands more. In a system which places considera-
ble importance on stare decisis, the preferable procedure is for the
adversary arguments to serve as an introduction and outline for the
court's research. The court should not be limited to the information
presented in the appellate briefs, lest the law be needlessly confused
and unpredictable.
The explanation for the inconsistency may be found in the prac-
tical problems facing the court. Appellate courts are traditionally
designed to function as multi-judge institutions. They are so designed
in order to spread the work load, and because a composite evaluation
and disposition of legal problems by courts composed of several judges
usually produces better results in terms of justice and order.2" How-
ever, Judge Finley believes that the point of diminishing returns has
been reached in Washington. He has stated: 26
Instead of functioning as a group whose collective training, experience,
wisdom, and judgment can be utilized in evaluating and disposing of
cases on appeal, there is a dangerous tendency, almost a necessity, to par-
cel out the cases proportionately to the individual judges, and to accept
and approve their judgment and recommended disposition of such cases.
* . * It bears repeating that this problem is not restricted to merely one
or two states, but it is chronic in most of them.
" Feigenbaum v. Brink was decided on April 29, 1965, and the principal case on
Sept. 9, 1965.
Finley, Some Observations on the Law and the Nature of the Judicial Process,
35 WAsH. L. REv. 1, 5 (1960).
^Id. at 5-6.
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It seems quite likely that the decision in the principal case is the
unfortunate consequence of this type of procedure. The net effect of
this procedure is that the court tends to be result-oriented. As it ap-
pears to have operated in the principal case, the assigned judge wrote
an opinion to which the other justices joined or dissented on result,
and careful attention to theory was neglected. The writer of the major-
ity opinion in the principal case was the author of the concurring
opinion in Feigenbaum, in which he concurred in the result but dis-
agreed with the abolition of assumption of risk. The writer of the
majority opinion in Feigenbaum signed the majority opinion in the
principal case." It is possible that the latter judge changed his mind,
or that the language regarding abolition was unimportant-or that,
because of workload pressure, the inconsistency was never discussed
and resolved. If the inconsistency is attributable to the decisional pro-
cedure forced by the court's tremendous workload, then measures
must be taken to improve the situation. An inviting solution is a pro-
posed constitutional amendment which would provide an intermediate
appellate court.2 In conjunction with an intermediate court, the
supreme court should have discretionary appellate jurisdiction so that
it would have greater control over its workload.
DEFINITION OF GROSS NEGLIGENCE UNDER
THE GUEST STATUTE
On a bright summer morning, defendant slowed her automobile,
intending to make a left turn. The road stretched dry and straight
before her for more than a mile. She turned on her left signal blinker,
observed a truck in the distance coming toward her, and looked in her
rear view mirror. Seeing a car pulling out to pass her, she slowed
further and waited for it to go by. Then she turned abruptly to the
left and drove straight into the path of the oncoming truck. Plaintiff
passenger, seriously injured in the collision, sued defendant, alleging
gross negligence. The trial court sustained defendant's challenge to
the evidence, ruling as a matter of law that defendant's actions did
'Judge Ott, who wrote the "majority" opinion in Feigenbaum, signed the
majority opinion in the principal case. Judge Donworth signed the majority
opinions in both cases, and Judge Hamilton, who joined Judges Ott and Donworth
in Feigenbaum, dissented in the principal case, but not because he reasoned that
assumption of risk had been abolished in the earlier case.
'ashington Judicial Council, Revision of Judicial Article IV of the Wash-
ington Constitution (2d proposed draft, docket No. 100, 1962).
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